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Abstract This article draws on historical material to examine the co-evolution of
economic science and business education over the course of the twentieth century,
showing that fields evolve not only through internal struggles but also through
struggles taking place in adjacent fields. More specifically, we argue that the scientific
strategies of business schools played an essential—if largely invisible and poorly
understood—role in major transformations in the organization and substantive direc-
tion of social-scientific knowledge, and specifically economic knowledge, in twenti-
eth century America. We use the Wharton School as an illustration of the earliest
trends and dilemmas (ca. 1900–1930), when business schools found themselves
caught between their business connections and their striving for moral legitimacy in
higher education. Next, we look at the creation of the Carnegie Tech Graduate School
of Industrial Administration after World War II. This episode illustrates the increas-
ingly successful claims of social scientists, backed by philanthropic foundations, on
business education and the growing appeal of “scientific” approaches to decision-
making and management. Finally, we argue that the rise of the Graduate School of
Business at the University of Chicago from the 1960s onwards (and its closely related
cousin at the University of Rochester) marks the decisive ascendancy of economics,
and particularly financial economics, in business education over the other behavioral
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disciplines. We document the key role of these institutions in diffusing “Chicago-
style” economic approaches—offering support for deregulatory policies and popu-
larizing narrowly financial understandings of the firm—that sociologists have de-
scribed as characteristic of the modern neo liberal regime.
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With hindsight, no transformation looks as consequential for the history of
American higher education as the extraordinary rise of business schools and
business degrees in the twentieth century. From its origins, at the beginning of
the century, in technical/vocational programs dominated by practitioners with
claims to moral leadership and ethical progress, business education has turned
into a large and highly organized field controlled by disciplines with scientific
claims. The first notable change was quantitative: in 1920, 1,576 students gradu-
ated from American universities with a BA in business; by 1940, the number had
climbed to 18,549; by 1950, it reached 72,137 (Silk 1960, p. 14); by 2001, no less
than 266,000 students, or 21 % of all BAs, were exiting American higher
education with a business degree—a far greater proportion than the 13 % who
did so in the 1940s (US Department of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics). Transformations at the graduate level were even more striking: The
number of MBAs awarded in the United States went from 110 in 1919 to 5,205 in
1958. Between 1960 and 1980, MBA education grew at an average annual rate of
12 %. More than 55,000 MBAs were granted in 1981, surpassing the combined
total of law and medical school degrees. In 2006, the number of MBAs awarded
annually in the United States exceeded 120,000 (Association to Advance
Collegiate Schools of Business [AACSB]). Once an almost exclusively American
phenomenon, the MBA degree is now granted in more than 100 countries and is
well on its way to becoming a globalized credential (Moon 2002).
The second significant change was qualitative. Business schools, which control the
production of certified managers (MBAs), have evolved from practitioner-dominated
programs struggling for academic legitimacy to become the largest employers of
disciplinarily trained social scientists, sometimes rivaling traditional departments in
the size and distinction of their faculty. In 2003–2004 for instance, there were 549
economics PhDs teaching in the top twenty US business schools, as compared to 637
in the top 20 economics departments (Blau 2005). This absorption of increasingly
large contingents of economics PhDs has turned business schools into formidable
players within economic science itself—a transformation that is attested by the
remarkable string of Nobel Prizes in economic science awarded to business school
scholars since 1990 (Fourcade 2009).
Broadly speaking, we can identify three historical (though partly overlapping)
phases in the transformation of the American business school over the course of the
twentieth century. In the early phase, which begins with the creation of the Wharton
School at the end of the nineteenth century, the business school was seen primarily as
a vocational institution with a moral dimension. The moral dimension it derived from
its embeddedness within the institutional framework of the university, often coupled
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with a liberal arts foundation. Practical problems in industry (for instance questions of
scale, anti-trust, government regulation, and, most prominently, labor relations),
however, occupied the most prominent place. These courses were practically orient-
ed, and indeed often taught by practitioners without specialized degrees, such as
engineers (e.g., Frederick Taylor, the father of scientific management, at the Tuck
School of Administration and Finance at Dartmouth) or accountants (e.g., George O.
May of Price Waterhouse, at the Harvard Business School).
A second phase begins in the 1950s and marks the advent of a new vision of the
contribution of business to society with the rise of “management science”—a new
formation that deliberately broke away from the existing disciplinary system and sought
to legitimate itself through hard-core technical capabilities. As is often typical, this
scientization of the business disciplines did not originate in the dominant schools (which
remained faithful to more institutionalist approaches) but at a brand new institution
striving for academic legitimacy, the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at the
Carnegie Institute of Technology. It is there that institutional misfits with a background
in operations research set out to import new decision-making techniques from military
and government settings into corporate organizations.
The third phase, which we illustrate here by curricular transformations at the
University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business in the 1960s, but which cut
across other institutions, focuses on the ascendancy of neoclassical economics in all
business matters. It is associated not only with the widespread diffusion of a strong
core of economists within the institution of the business school, but also with the
transformation of the subject matter and analytical orientations of economics itself.
We argue that this transformation helped produce and sustain new understandings of
the nature of the firm, with far-reaching consequences for business practices and
economic relations in society.
To be sure, economists were prominently involved in all three phases of this
process: as we will see, they laid claims on business education from the very
beginning. But the long-term trend is unmistakably one of increased, if contested,
interpenetration, particularly noticeable in the most recent period. From representing
one subject among others at the turn of the century, economics has become the largest
discipline found in business schools (AACSB 1999); in addition, it has come to exert
commanding influence on all other aspects of the business curriculum—including
organization studies, accounting, marketing, operations research, strategy, and most
important of all, finance (Ferraro et al. 2005). Conversely, the association with
business education has transformed economics in important ways, both in terms of
the discipline’s economic standing and in terms of its substantive orientations. It has
also helped reorient prevailing views about the purpose of the corporation, as well as
power relations within them, in ways that favor the interests of owners of economic
capital.
The co-evolution of economic “science,” business education, and (as we will
suggest) models of corporate control in the twentieth century may be analyzed as
an instance of what Andrew Abbott (2005) calls “linked ecologies.” Drawing on the
Chicago school of urban sociology, which made extensive use of this notion, Abbott
suggests that an “ecology” is simply an intermediate social structure, like a profession
or the higher education system, that weighs in on individual action. Ecologies are
analytical constructs, of course. They are heuristic tools that serve to represent the
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social world according to a topological metaphor (and from that point of view the
concept of “ecology” is not unrelated to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of field).1
Furthermore, we must think of the boundaries of ecologies as being fluid and
dynamic, shaped by other ecologies: “Instead of envisioning a particular ecology as
having a set of fixed surrounds,” Abbott argues, “I reconceptualize the social world in
terms of linked ecologies, each of which acts as a (flexible) surround for others.”
(2005, p. 246) He then identifies two types of linkages between ecologies: 1)
professional strategies or technical innovations that transform several different pro-
fessions at once [hinges, in Abbott’s terminology]; 2) the expansion of an existing
profession into a new ecology [avatars]. Medical licensing, which serves to develop
both a medical jurisdiction within society and a licensing jurisdiction within the state,
is an example of a hinge connecting the two ecologies of the state and professions.
The technological artifacts of economics, such as the Black-Scholes formula (for
pricing derivatives; see MacKenzie 2006) or the user cost of capital (for investment
decisions by corporations), can be construed in a similar way: in both cases, these
formulas opened up new “scientific” possibilities at the same time that they expanded
practical jurisdictions in the financial markets and corporate accounting through the
production of new vocabularies, technologies, and skills. The institutionalization of
economics’ claims with respect to business-relevant knowledge and the training of
businessmen may be thought of as an avatar (i.e., the migration of a discipline into a
new jurisdictional setting). But, as we show in our empirical analysis, this process is
much more than a straightforward diffusion, because the avatar also acts back on the
ecology that originated it. In the case we study, economists did not colonize the weak
institutional setting of the business school from an external position of power (as the
avatar image would suggest); rather, it was people in a dominated and sometimes
marginal position within economics who, with institutional backing from philan-
thropic foundations, build up the business school into an academic powerhouse—
thereby transforming the disciplinary ecology of economics (and their own careers) in
the process.
The emergence of hinges and avatars is never straightforward nor automatic.
Rather, it is an eminently political process, resulting from the mobilization of
individuals and institutions around particular projects, material assemblages and
legitimation strategies. Ecological hinges and avatars are the product of human
coalitions and positional movements by people seeking to establish their authority
through the development or reorganization of institutions—in that sense, it is an
“enrollment” process (Latour 1987) of sorts, whereby institutions are mobilized and
transformed in an effort to assert one’s position vis-à-vis relevant audiences to and
convince potential allies. This process, of course, is especially tricky to negotiate
when the institutions themselves have multiple sources of allegiance (though such
ambivalence may also be a source of strength).
American business schools typically faced three conflicting modes of acquiring
what Paul Starr (1982) calls “cultural authority:” Practical relevance, academic
authority, and doing good. The practice-oriented constituencies toward which busi-
ness schools directed their knowledge brought to the fore the concerns and political
1 But see Abbott’s discussion of the difference between his concept of ecology and Bourdieu’s concept of
field at http://home.uchicago.edu/~aabbott/Papers/BOURD.pdf (accessed July 1, 2010).
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designs of corporate actors. The academically-oriented constituencies within univer-
sities exerted a powerful pull in an opposite direction—often expressing a sharp
disdain for anything practical (e.g., by preferring the “pure” sciences and liberal arts),
and urging for much more scientific approaches to practical problems (e.g. the
development of engineering and the applied sciences). Finally, philanthropies (on
which the new schools were financially and symbolically dependent) had their own
agenda, too: they saw themselves as agents of social progress, moral education, and
institutional innovation.
There have thus been three main strategies of institutional legitimation for business
schools—utilitarian, scientific, and moral—although in practice legitimacy claims
have often mixed all three (Khurana 2007). Our focus in this article is on the scientific
strategies of business schools, a largely invisible (and poorly understood) factor in
major transformations in the organization and substantive direction of social-
scientific knowledge, and specifically economic knowledge, in twentieth century
America. Economics, indeed, has been a driving force in the scientific and technical
upgrading of the business school since the 1950s. In social scientific fields, business-
school based knowledge production has often converged intellectually with arts and
sciences-based production; it has also fostered powerful academic enterprises of its
own—in the form of professional journals and associations that claim distinct, but
related, disciplinary identities (e.g., organizational behavior for sociology, finance for
economics).2 As a result, business schools are no longer disciplinary backwaters for
the social sciences: they have, instead, become important sites of substantive and
ideological struggle over the “soul” of various disciplines. (Yonay 1998)
In this article, we narrate this intellectual and institutional journey by looking
selectively at three critical ways in which the sometimes “avatared,” sometimes
“hinged” evolution of the fields of economics and business knowledge was articu-
lated historically: personnel management in the 1920s-1930s; systems and decision
analysis in the 1940s and 1950s; and the new “financial economics” in the 1960s and
1970s. As business schools have risen to material power and social prominence, their
academic influence cannot be ignored anymore, which poses the question of the
distinctiveness of the knowledge produced in their midst (knowing that we focus
specifically on the elite institutions, which have the strongest scientific claims). In
other words, did the shifting material base of economic knowledge production (in the
form of the expansion of the “business school” ecology) matter for the scientific and
political trajectory of economics? We suggest that it did, bringing new substantive
and methodological concerns to the fore, in dialogue with the changing shape,
operating procedures and culture of American corporations (Fligstein 1990;
Haveman and Rao 1997). These linkages are certainly complex and many-sided, so
the story we tell is a necessarily contingent one. But it is one that has significant
implications for understanding changing ideological orientations within the field of
economics and (given business schools’ key role in the training of managers) within
society at large—a question that has been largely overlooked by both the history of
economics and the scholarship on neoliberalism.
2 Note that what is true of economics is also true of sociology and psychology. Witness, for instance, the
development of network analysis, largely a by-product of the migration of sociology into schools of
business.
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The moral education of American businessmen
It is important to disentangle the vast expansion of business education at the under-
graduate level, which mainly occurred in public universities, from the much more
exclusive form, which became institutionalized in private universities around a
graduate-level curriculum (Veysey 1965; Jencks and Riesman 1969; Engwall et al.
2010). In the first case, the development of undergraduate colleges of business seems
to have been conceived largely as a response to public demands in a competitive
environment, as well as a natural extension of the “practical”mission laid out in many
of these universities’ public charters. Private universities, by contrast, pioneered the
concept of the business school as the privileged training ground for what they defined
as the emerging tasks of management, which was understood to apply very broadly—
the corporation, indeed, was just one outlet for managerial training, along with public
service and philanthropic work. Modeled after earlier professional schools,3 business
schools at elite universities (e.g., Harvard, Chicago, Dartmouth) were to recruit
educated liberal arts undergraduates and turn them into leaders with administrative
competence. These schools saw themselves as gateways into the elite, and crafted
their institutional projects accordingly. The creation of the first Master of Business
Administration degree at Harvard Business School in 1908, the drive toward profes-
sionalization (with the establishment of doctoral programs in business, as well as
academic journals and associations during the 1920s), and the conscious choice to
confine business education to the graduate level at Dartmouth (1900) and Harvard
(1908), then at Chicago (1946), Columbia (1952), and Carnegie Tech (1952), were all
efforts to protect the selectivity and exclusivity of management training, to affirm its
status and seriousness of purpose vis-à-vis the rest of the university, and to establish
the scientific rigor of management as a discipline.
Within this very broad and very varied field, institutions differentiated themselves
by mission and style, seeking to establish a niche and specific reputation for them-
selves. A few schools stood out by specifically emphasizing their academic ambitions
over vocational ones, and it is this subset that interests us here, because how they did
so was especially consequential to the development of economics—the discipline
then assumed to be most relevant to business. It is, indeed, this ambition that gives
potency to the ecological linkage between the two fields.
The newly created institutions’ most pressing goal in the earlier period was to
define their place within the broader field of higher education. Some faced tensions
with their parent universities over the seriousness of their curriculum; many also
struggled to reconcile their search for business connections with their longing for
moral legitimacy, which permeated the field. Certainly these tensions played out
differently in different places. However, in a way broadly characteristic of the
Progressive period, the solutions generally involved professionalization and the
search for moral grounding. It is during the earlier part of the twentieth century, for
instance, that business ethics emerged and flourished (Abend 2008), and that the
ideology of professions as normative institutions (Parsons 1939) took root in
American sociology. Still, different institutions took different paths. Privileged by
3 For instance, when the Harvard Business School was founded in 1908, the medical school had been
around since 1782, the law school since 1817, and the divinity school since 1819.
126 Theor Soc (2013) 42:121–159
its parent school’s dominant reputation and socially exclusive recruitment, Harvard
Business School embraced the managerial ideal most confidently, cultivating close
relationships with corporate elites through the development of a practical, case-based
curriculum (which involved them), and taking for granted the notion that its students
were the future leaders of America’s companies (Aronson 1992). Other schools, such
as the School of Commerce and Administration (as it was originally named) at the
more recently founded (1892) University of Chicago remained committed to the
liberal arts as the normal foundation of business education—as of any form of
education. The Wharton School, which we begin our narrative with, stood some-
where between these two extremes and emphasized the empirical social sciences,
which seemed at the time to offer a path between practical relevance and moral
education—but also, as we will see, exposed the institution to political criticism from
unsympathetic constituencies.
The creation of the Carnegie Tech Graduate School of Industrial Administration
after World War II illustrates the second phase in our historical account. It is through
this example that we discuss the increasingly successful claims of social scientists,
backed by philanthropic foundations, on business education and the growing appeal,
in the 1950s, of “scientific” approaches to decision-making and management. Gone
were the days when the liberal arts were seen as relevant to the education of American
businessmen. Rationality was the new modus operandi, and what were now called the
“behavioral sciences”4 seemed to offer the greatest promise for solving the problems
of American society and economy. As we show in this article, these transformations
were also homologically related to changes in the prevailing mode of governance in
the American economy: in particular, business schools became essential sites for the
emergence of tools and methods for the management of the new large, diversified
conglomerates that had developed as a result of economic mobilization during World
War II and increased federal prohibitions on vertical and horizontal mergers (which
encouraged strategies of unrelated diversification by default –see Fligstein 1990;
Chandler 1990). Input–output approaches, linear programming, and statistical fore-
casting methods, for example, were all developed in this context, foreshadowing the
incorporation of new computational tools into mainstream economics.5
Finally, the rise of the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business—
which really begins in the late 1950s—marks the decisive ascendancy of economics,
and particularly finance, over the other social-scientific disciplines laying claims on
the business curriculum. Furthermore, the diffusion of “Chicago-style” economics
into business schools became a powerful vehicle for the transformation of the field of
economics itself. It helped produce both the microeconomic turn in modern economic
analysis and the emergence of narrowly financial understandings of the firm, which
would ultimately help reorient business practices toward what Fligstein (1990) has
4 The term “behavioral sciences” was explicitly employed by the Ford Foundation against the older notion
of “social sciences,” which was deemed too political (Macdonald 1956).
5 Note that many studies have documented the growth of MBAs in American corporations. Mayo et al.
(2007) show a significant increase in the education level of American business executives during the 20th
century, with the MBA growing fastest among advanced degrees. Additionally, Zorn (2004) has shown that
even beneath the CEO level, CFOs have become an important part of the senior executive team and that
their backgrounds and training are less likely to come from accounting and more likely resemble the
strategic finance and financial engineering taught in MBA programs.
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termed the “financial” conception of the firm, or the idea that the sole purpose of
management and the essential social mission of the corporation, is the maximization
of shareholder value.6
Business education between vocationalism and progressivism
When the first colleges of administration, commerce, accounting, and finance were
established at the turn of the twentieth century, they were “largely an outgrowth of the
subject of economics,” in the assessment of the first meticulous survey of the field
(Bossard and Dewhurst 1931, p. 325). Writing in 1913, Leon C. Marshall, dean of the
University of Chicago’s College of Commerce and Administration (later the Graduate
School of Business), wrote of the school’s beginnings: “[T]his college succeeded in
little more than making provision for the grouping of existing courses in economics
and closely related subjects” (1913, p. 98). Northwestern University’s dean described
the business school as “a very ill-defined institution. It may begin with the freshman
year; it may start only after graduation from college; or it may start anywhere in
between. It may represent courses in economics regrouped and relabeled, or it may
omit all so-called economic courses and center exclusively on practical courses in
administration” (Hotchkiss 1920, p. 92). The fact is that when professors took charge
of establishing business schools within the institutional framework of the university,
they tended to approach the problem of business education from the point of view of
the dominant academic perspective. In particular, they crafted the business curriculum
around those disciplines that were then thought to embody the highest promise of
social progress, namely the social sciences. Marshall, again, was particularly explicit
about this: students at the University of Chicago’s College of Commerce and
Administration had to start their studies with a “broad cultural foundation” in the
liberal arts, followed by a “broad survey of the social sciences,” before receiving
specialized instruction in one of three possible careers: business, civil service, or
charitable and philanthropic service (Marshall 1913, p. 100). More often than not,
early business school leaders were recruited from the social science faculty: “In the
general stampede, every little college sets up, on paper, its department or school of
business and the professor of economics, who maybe has not known the difference
between an invoice and an inventory, becomes the dean” (Wolfe 1926, p. 231). In
order to appeal to their primary audience, however, these “economists” had to carve a
special niche for themselves—pragmatic, commercial, but still reliably legitimate for
their discipline of origin.
6 The most conspicuous omission in this panorama is, of course, Harvard Business School, which we have
excluded for substantive reasons that will become clearer in the remainder of the article. The fact is that in
spite of its pioneering role in establishing business education in the United States, Harvard’s trajectory in
this domain remained quite disconnected from evolutions at other major schools. Harvard’s relative
autonomy is attributable largely to its size, financial autonomy from the larger university, preeminent status
as one of the oldest business schools in the country, and, finally, to the distinctiveness and success of its
clinical approach to business education and powerful connections with the business world, which partly
buffered it from the competitive pressures that applied elsewhere.
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“Applied economics”: labor problems, institutionalism, and philanthropy
in the American business school
It is in this context that a number of so-called “new school economists”—broadly
progressive in their political outlook, interested in social reform, rejecting the more
abstract legacies of British Marshallianism in favor of a more hands-on and “private”
approach to problems of business—found themselves closely associated with the
construction of business schools: Edwin Gay, the founding dean of Harvard Business
School, was an economic historian (Heaton 1952); Edmund James, the first director
of the Wharton School (1883–1896), was a railway and public utilities specialist.
James’s successor at Wharton, Simon Patten (1896–1912), embedded his economics
in broader questions of social philosophy and was an early promoter of experimental
economics. Roswell McCrea, who followed Patten at Wharton and later founded the
Columbia Business School, worked on tax issues within different industries. These
men were by and large “applied economists” and many had strong intellectual
affiliations with the institutionalist movement.
What did this mean on the ground? The trajectory of the Wharton School before
World War I offers a telling empirical illustration of the intellectual orientation of
economics as it was practiced within the context of the American business school. So
we begin this narrative with Wharton, focusing more specifically on the social
trajectory of its founding dean, Edmund James, and the people he surrounded himself
with.
James was trained in political economy in Germany during the heyday of the
historical school. Like his friends Richard T. Ely and Simon Patten, whom he had met
on the Continent, he was a Progressive, committed to social reform. And like them,
James became an outspoken promoter of professionalization as a way to make policy
advocacy publicly legitimate and acceptable (Furner 1975). He was militantly in-
volved in the movement to separate administration from politics and was a founder, in
1894, of the National Municipal League, a progressive organization that sought to
make government less “corrupt” and more “efficient.” Finally, his campaign for
rationalization included business—partly because the boundaries between public
and “industrial” administration were still not all that clearly drawn. Business, James
argued, was as legitimate a subject of study as law and medicine, and as legitimate a
starting point for rational social reform as any. This was a position that resonated well
with the aspirations of new wealthy elites—someone like Joseph Wharton for
instance.
In 1881, Wharton, a devout Quaker and successful Philadelphia industrialist, gave
$100,000 to the University of Pennsylvania to establish a school of finance and
commerce.7 Part of Wharton’s motivation was his perception that technical innova-
tions were radically shifting the context within which American businesses were
operating. But of even greater importance was his feeling that American business
elites needed to embrace new social roles to serve a nation that was undergoing
tremendous social change. The proposed school was to train future leaders to
“manage” competently while also working toward the welfare of society: “No
7 In its early years, the Wharton School was not a separate entity but a department within the university’s
arts and sciences college.
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country,” Wharton argued, “can afford to have this inherited wealth and capacity
wasted for want of that fundamental knowledge which would enable the possessors to
employ them with advantage to themselves and to the community” (Joseph Wharton,
Vision for Wharton School, 1881, as quoted in Sass 1982, p. 23).
The Wharton School attracted the attention of the American Bankers Association
as “the only institution of higher rank which was busying itself with the [problem of
professional education for the business classes]” (James 1898, p. xv). In 1890, the
association sent James to Europe for a year to study how business was being taught.
Published as The Education of Business Men in Europe (1898), James’ study detailed
the history and curricula of commercial schools in the leading industrialized countries
of Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, and England.8 Upon returning from
Europe, James traveled throughout the United States, repeating his call for the
introduction of business studies into the higher education curriculum.
Like many other academics at the time, James was an opponent of laissez-faire
dogmatism, of the deductive approach to economics, and of the application of
mathematics to economics. In 1885, for instance, he wrote a scathing critique of
Simon Newcomb’s Principles of Political Economy for the Princeton Review, ignit-
ing (together with Richard T. Ely, another prominent institutionalist economist) an
American version of the German Methodenstreit. (Newcomb, then America’s fore-
most mathematician and astronomer, was an early convert to marginalism and the use
of mathematics in economics.)9 Others at Wharton held similar positions. At stake
was not only the proper approach to economics (the integrated and historical view of
society as opposed to the search for universal laws) but also the relationship between
economics and politics. Simon Patten, who succeeded James at the head of Wharton,
was even more sanguine on the subject. According to him, there could be “no full
discussion of economic problems without bringing political and moral principles into
relation with the economic.” In fact, Patten defined the laws of economics not as
explanations but, instead, as enumerations of “what qualities must be impressed upon
men in the struggle for the higher civilization which the conditions of life permit”
(Sass 1982, p. 100). Under his leadership the Wharton School embarked on an
ambitious program to study the social problems of the day.
As Furner (1975) and Ross (1991) have shown, the institutionalization of social
science in American universities was a generally contested process, and business
colleges were no exception. Some of the initial enthusiasm in favor of the develop-
ment of political economy at the University of Pennsylvania (certainly on Joseph
Wharton’s part, for instance) had been fueled by the desire to promote the protec-
tionist doctrines of the Philadelphia-born economist Henry C. Carey. The fact that
Patten was a staunch defender of protectionism had made him eminently attractive to
Wharton—and indeed there is evidence that Patten spread the protectionist gospel
8 See Locke 1984 for a comparative history of business school systems.
9 Marginal utility theory commonly refers to a set of conceptual and mathematical tools (specifically
differential calculus) developed in continental European economics at the end of the nineteenth century to
study economic behavior “at the margin” and thereby assess the efficiency of resource allocation.
Methodologically, analytically, and sometimes politically as well, marginalist economists often found
themselves at odds with economists advocating more institutional and historical approaches to the
economy. The fiercest intellectual battles involved the German (historicist) and Austrian (marginalist)
schools of economics, but similar struggles took place also in England, France, and the United States.
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quite effectively among his students (Sass 1982). But the question of social reform
was much more difficult to negotiate with the trustees, and on these matters Patten
found himself, like many of his colleagues, much at odds with the interests of those
who funded and controlled the university. In 1915 a conflict erupted at Wharton over
the teachings and anti-war views of political economy professor Scott Nearing and
the “trustees encouraged a general exodus of Progressive economists” from Wharton
in the years that followed. Patten himself, now seen as an unpopular agitator and
pacifist, was forced to resign in 1917 (Sass 1988, p. 139).10
The equivocal nature of Progressive ideology was revealed in these conflicts. For
many active participants in the Progressive movement, the point of social and
economic reforms was not to make American society more just (though socialist
overtones were certainly not absent from some Progressive writings) but rather to
moralize its functioning, make it more predictable and thereby improve the efficiency
of the economy. It was hoped that experts-led rationalization by engineers and social
scientists would rid society of all sorts of moral evils, from the spoils system in
government to price fixing in industry, from wasteful spending to alcohol and
prostitution. James and Patten were among many economists who embraced these
crusades—recall, for instance, Thorstein Veblen’s rants against waste in The Theory
of the Leisure Class, and against the manipulation of output by financial managers in
The Engineers and the Price System. Other institutionalists (Leon Marshall (of the
School of Commerce at the University of Chicago), Edwin Gay (of Harvard Business
School), even Wesley Mitchell (Columbia University)) ardently supported scientific
management as the best way to control fluctuations in the economy (source of all
evils) and to lay business on a more secure ethical footing. It is in part on the strength
of these associations that they found themselves closely associated with the effort to
establish and develop schools of business in the United States.
This perspective also received vindication from philanthropic foundations and
government agencies. By the 1920s, commissioned projects and the founding of
new, empirically oriented research organizations started to advance the idea that
social and economic knowledge contributed to the betterment of American capital-
ism, to the benefit of all. In Washington, Secretary of Commerce (1921–1927), then
President (1929–1933), Herbert Hoover began enrolling social scientists into his new
technocratic economic order (Barber 1985), and business school officials actively
sought the connection. In 1921 the first research center devoted to the study of the
“economic and social problems of business” was founded, with support from the
Carnegie Corporation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, at the
Wharton School as the Industrial Research Department (IRD). The Department’s
10 A member of the Pennsylvania Child Labor Committee, Nearing had been convinced by his work there
that local businessmen were responsible for keeping local youngsters in their factories and preventing the
passage of laws regulating child labor. During the 1910s, Nearing published a series of works denouncing
this practice, and more generally attacking workers’ low wages, industrial accidents, monopoly, urban
congestion, and sanitation problems as major sources of inefficiency in the American economy (see, for
example, Nearing 1911). This position, and later his antiwar views, had irritated members of the state
legislature (which partly bankrolled the university), as well as prominent trustees, and Nearing was
promptly fired—one of the many victims of the “academic freedom” persecutions so well chronicled by
Furner (1975). Also see Nearing (1919). The firing of both Nearing and Patten was officially attributed to
their antiwar views.
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founding director was an economics PhD from the University of Pennsylvania,
Joseph Willits, who used it as a platform to advocate for personnel management
policies as a way to prevent social crises.11 Less radical than Nearing and Patten,
Willits worked mainly through cooperative studies with selected local industries to
develop new labor relations techniques that, he hoped, would help improve the social
environment of business.
The first two decades of the twentieth century had been marked by a sharp
intensification of industrial unrest, culminating after World War I (Shenhav 1999).
The rapid turnover of the workforce was also a major preoccupation of businessmen
during the war and the 1920s. Not only was the need to stabilize populations of
workers politically and physically seen as the central industrial problem of the day but
solving this problem seemed to reconcile the Progressives’ aspirations for social
betterment with American corporate practices. It is in this context that American
philanthropies became heavily involved in sponsoring studies of working conditions
and financing the emergence of the social work profession. Beardsley Ruml, who
headed the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, explained the move: “[I]t was
felt that through the social sciences might come more intelligent measures of social
control that would reduce such irrationalities as are represented by poverty, class
conflict and war between nations” (cited in Magat 1999, p. 56). Workplace organi-
zation and personnel management practices loomed large among the preoccupations
of engineers and economists, particularly those working in business schools, who saw
these issues as holding the key to the problems that seemed to plague the American
economy: inefficiency, labor struggle, absenteeism and poor work effort.12 At
Wharton, for instance, the first studies by Willits’ Industrial Research Department
were concerned with workplace organization and personnel management, then de-
scribed as issues of “social mobility”; it is also at the IRD that a young Australian
psychologist named Elton Mayo did his first US-based work on the effect of
employee reverie and fatigue on industrial turnover.
Other business school leaders played similar roles as power brokers in the insti-
tutional nexus that linked universities, foundations, and governments: like Willits,
Edwin F. Gay of Harvard Business School was actively involved in the Social
Science Research Council (SSRC) and the founding and activities of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Council on Foreign Relations, while
also leading the development of methods and efforts to collect federal statistics about
the economy and American society. Edmund E. Day, who became the founding dean
of the business school at the University of Michigan after chairing the Harvard
economics department, went on to head the social sciences division of the Laura
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund (later integrated into the Rockefeller
Foundation) and “played a crucial role in tying together the SSRC to Rockefeller
philanthropy” (Fisher 1993, p. 72).
11 Willits was, in many ways, an example of the consummate academic insider of the interwar period—he
worked on Hoover’s Emergency Committee for Employment, helped found and presided over the National
Bureau of Economic Research, became dean of Wharton during the 1930s and ended his career as a
Rockefeller Foundation official.
12 See, e.g., Bruce 2005, on the importance of personnel management concerns in American economics
during the 1910s and early 1920s. Also Shenhav 1995.
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Where did all this leave economics in the business curriculum during the interwar
period? In most places there remained a general, though perfunctory, agreement that
economics—particularly the empirical, institutional economic knowledge so prized
by philanthropic foundations and public institutions—had an essential role to play in
business education. The lack of specialized training for business school faculty meant
that economics graduates still provided a natural pool of educated men to recruit
from. Moreover, some administrators believed that strengthening the tie between
economics and business would shield both fields from their natural flaws. Thus while
business courses were criticized for their ad hoc character and failure to address broad
social and economic questions, discipline-based economics was (already) criticized
for being ignorant of the practical demands and concerns of American employers.13
The abysmal failure of American capitalism to deliver prosperity after 1929, the
foundations’ aggressive promotion of social scientific research as a means to improve
governance, and the activist stance of the Roosevelt administration in social and
economic matters were all in part responsible for the broad reevaluation of the place
of business schools in American society and higher education that took place during
the 1930s (Khurana 2007). Business schools throughout the entire field—not only at
elite institutions—began to justify their mission in academic, rather than in practical,
terms, attaching themselves more firmly to the institution and purpose of the univer-
sity.14 Economics had a role to play in this new environment, both to help restore the
legitimacy of the corporation as a moral institution and to assist government at all
levels in crafting a path out of the economic malaise (the New Deal attracted a
unprecedented number of university social science graduates into government em-
ployment). Hence during his deanship of the school from 1933 to 1939, Joseph
Willits called for a return to Wharton’s original mission of producing “applied”
research on economic and social problems, which meant, at the time, labor economics
13 Roswell McCrea, who followed Patten as Dean of the Wharton School, argued: “Economics, where ever
else it may or may not belong, does belong in the school of business. Both business and economics need to
be saved from themselves. Without the presence of economics in some vital form, the work of a school of
business is likely to degenerate into detail description of business organization and procedure, with no
organizing principle other than the possible one of search for effective competitive devices, and with no
clear vision of the social goal of business activity. And economics, divorced from business, is too likely to
spend itself either in closet philosophizing by traditional modes, altogether too little affected with a present
interest, or in fortifying predilections regarding public policy with broadly garnered data too remote from
the intimate, work-a-day world of fresh experience to yield much more than a crop of articles, books, and
book reviews. If schools of business realize their opportunities, the economic theory of the future will grow
out of their researches and will be formulated by their teachers. The joining of socially motivated thinking
with a knowledge of concrete, shifting reality, such as can be effected in a school of business, may well
escape the puttering of the strict vocationalist on the one hand, and the futility of the closet philosopher on
the other. The foundations of wise business policy can be laid in this as in no other way.” (McCrea 1925, p.
222) The University of Pennsylvania is indeed one of the few elite universities in America whose
economics department originated from within the business school: it was only in 1974, in fact, that
Wharton economists decamped to the school of arts and sciences.
14 For example, the University of Mississippi’s business school, whose pre-Depression mission statement
emphasized narrow technical skills, revised it to include the advancement of knowledge on “fundamental
questions of economics and philosophy which influence the course of a dynamic age.” The University of
Oklahoma’s business school, whose mission statement, prior to 1930, stressed the economic value of its
degree, shifted to wanting to “enable [students] to understand the public problems, particularly those having
to do with the interrelationships between different businesses, between business and government, and
between the employer and employee.” Similar changes could be found at the University of Michigan, New
York University, and the University of California.
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broadly construed (Kaufman 2000). In the words of Columbia’s Dean Woodbridge,
who created a series of joint appointments between the economics faculty and the
business school, the Depression served as “an appropriate occasion for welding these
separate units [Business and Economics] at least as far as graduate work was
concerned, into a closer integration” (Van Metre 1954, p. 78). But it is only after
World War II that the ultimate effects of this scientific reorientation of business
schools would be felt, with new forms of academic scientism becoming much more
central to the institutions’ rhetoric about themselves, to their curriculum, and to their
understanding of their vocational mission.
This process, however, was tied to the scientific transformation of economics
itself, following the logic of linked ecologies discussed earlier. Between the 1930s
and 1940s, the institutional approaches that dominated “applied economics” started
being challenged by younger generations of statistically oriented practitioners with
new scientific ambitions. Within business schools, economists were losing their
exclusive claims to the study of labor problems to psychologists, sociologists, and
the new “industrial relations” specialists (Kaufman 2000). But just as economics’
natural jurisdiction over the study of business seemed to be weakening, it was
recaptured under a new form: through the provision of decision-making tools to
preside over increasingly complex production processes. Characteristically, it took an
outsider institution—a brand new school not beholden to traditional knowledge-
making practices and existing constituencies—and a new set of philanthropic aspira-
tions (dominated, this time, by the Ford Foundation), to effect the change. But before
we discuss how Carnegie Tech changed business education, let us step back a little to
consider the disciplinary and institutional environment that brought this small school
to the center stage of business education in the 1950s.
From scientific management to management science
By the late 1950s, American economics had undergone a dramatic transformation.
The dominant approach during the interwar period, institutionalism, was on its way
out, gradually displaced by the rise of mathematical economics (Yonay 1998). The
collection of large streams of data by federal agencies and the construction of national
accounts (initiated by Kuznets, a Wharton school economist, in 1937 at the National
Bureau of Economic Research), combined with the birth of macroeconomics, was
spearheading a new, theoretically-oriented approach to empirical work. The shift to
model-building as the alpha and omega of the economist’s craft was most dramati-
cally announced by the publication of Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic
Analysis in 1947, in which Samuelson laid out the new approach to economics as an
instance of mathematically-driven deduction, much like theoretical physics.
This change did not sit well with all audiences, however. Foundations officials
were disheartened by the esoteric nature of the new economics. More importantly,
segments of the business world were annoyed by the Keynesian orientations of the
young generation. As Samuelson put it, “Keynesianism was a naughty word polit-
ically long after the war,” frequently lumped together with communism in right-wing
circles (in Colander and Landreth 1996, p. 170). Neoclassical economists, many
business leaders felt, had replaced the celebration of the private enterprise system
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and opposition to regulatory frameworks with a new fascination with macroeconomic
aggregates and, as time progressed, a growing acceptance of government intervention
in all business matters (Bornemann 1957, pp. 135–136). A survey of the teaching of
economics carried out for the Sloan Foundation plainly expressed this dissatisfaction
with what some perceived as a new form of radicalism (McKee and Moulton 1951).15
But macroeconomics and regulation were not the only features of the new economics
in the postwar period. To a large extent, the most consequential developments for the
future of business education came not from the consolidating neoclassical synthesis in
universities but from a rather unlikely source: the nebulae of institutions and research
centers sponsored by the growing social-scientific interests of defense-related agencies
and think tanks. It is in this sector that we can identify the intellectual sources of a new
“scientific”—meaning, in this case, quantitative and positivist—approach to manage-
ment, to be taken up and systematized on a massive scale through the financial and
moral involvement of American foundations in business education. Indeed the new era
in the relationship between economics and business can be understood as the outcome of
three joint developments: first, the general transformation of the social sciences under
the influence of operations research and military funding during and after World War II
(Simon 1991; Mirowski 2002); second, the scientization of the business curriculum,
brought about by a new power configuration in business school education dominated by
the Ford Foundation; and third, the emergence of the conglomerate model of corporate
organization, which, as we will see, bore more than an “elective affinity” with the new
techniques being developed in economic research circles. The dramatic success, barely a
few years after its founding, of the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at the
Carnegie Institute of Technology provides an exemplary illustration of all three trends,
as well as of their interpenetrating logics.
The GSIA and administrative behaviorism
We have seen that the founding (and often subsequent) deans of the business schools
at Wharton, Harvard, the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and
many other schools were all economists. The new business school at the Carnegie
Institute of Technology, which William Larimer Mellon, the founder of the Gulf Oil
Company, helped establish in 1949, was no exception to this rule: its first dean, Lee
Bach, was a University of Chicago economics graduate; at the time of his appoint-
ment, he was also the chairman of the Carnegie economics department.
The Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA), as it came to be known,
would go on to offer a new model for studying and teaching business. The approach
would be decisively technical and methods-oriented, and quite scornful of traditional,
practitioner-dominated forms of training as well as of disciplinary mainstreams.
Indeed, it is perhaps the GSIA’s marginality vis-à-vis dominant business schools
and academic departments that enabled it to cultivate a certain intellectual autonomy
15 One response from the business world and foundations was to sponsor new economic research institu-
tions, the most important of which was the Committee for Economic Development, a think tank filled with
economics faculty and graduates from the University of Chicago, some of them closely affiliated with the
Graduate School of Business (Collins 1978).
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and play a decisive role as an incubator of new approaches within economics in the
1950s and 1960s (including behavioral economics, modern finance theory, and—
perhaps most significantly—the theory of rational expectations).
GSIA’s original mandate says it all. Funded with a six million dollar grant from
Mellon, the Graduate School of Industrial Administration was to “… help the
growing need in American industry for potential executives trained in both engineer-
ing and management” (Fact Sheet: Official Dedication, Carnegie GSIA, 1952). But
where did this new orientation come from? To some extent from the school’s first
dean, Lee Bach. A doctoral student in economics during the 1930s, Bach had been
deeply affected by the Depression and frustrated at the impotence of the social
sciences, especially his own, in solving social problems.16 After receiving his PhD
from the University of Chicago in 1940, Bach obtained a US Navy commission and
spent most of World War II working on postwar economic reconstruction planning.
At the end of the war, he accepted an appointment as chairman of the economics
department at Carnegie, where he became a close confidant of William Larimer
Mellon. Mellon had a strong interest in business education, and Bach eventually
succeeded in convincing him to underwrite a new type of business school.
As dean-elect of a school that was yet to be built, Bach spent a year visiting the
classrooms of the country’s leading business schools. With the exception of Harvard,
“which was lively and [where he found himself] intrigued with the advantages of the
new ‘case method,”’ Bach found that most of the business school programs consisted
of either applied general economics or “how-to” approaches based on prevailing best
practices among leading business firms. Little research was being done and doctoral
programs, where they existed at all, were weak. Business schools tended to be at the
bottom of the academic pecking order, often ranking below agriculture and education
schools.17
Against the traditional model, Bach argued that business education ought to be an
extension of the social sciences, rooted in quantitative analysis and the behavioral
disciplines (Bach 1960a). As Herbert Simon put it in his autobiography, “Almost
none of the founding fathers of GSIA had extensive backgrounds in management or
business education. We were social scientists who had discovered in one way or
another that organizational and business environments provide a fertile source of
business ideas and who therefore did not regard basic and applied as antithetical
terms” (Simon 1991, pp. 138–139).
Simon was, along with statistician William Cooper, the other original pillar of the
GSIA. Cooper was born in poverty and owed his higher education to luck and the
benevolence of a wealthy patron, who sponsored his studies in economics at the
University of Chicago. (He then went on to do graduate work at Columbia.) Like
many in his generation, Cooper found himself caught up in government service
16 Bach described an incident in his economics class where “the professor was explaining that theoretically
there couldn’t be a lasting depression in a competitive, capitalist-type economy. I looked out the window at
a long line of unemployed men, waiting to apply for two WPA jobs the town government had managed to
get.” Bach thought there “must be a better way” for economics (Bach in Gleeson and Schlossman 1995).
17 Interviews carried out by Marion Fourcade with American economists confirmed that as late as the
1970s–1980s, business schools were not considered highly reputable places for young economics graduates
to start a career. (The Chicago GSB changed all that.)
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during the last years of the Great Depression, working at the Tennessee Valley
Authority. He stayed in government during World War II, where his statistical skills
drew him into operations research. As for Herbert Simon, Philip Mirowski describes
him as the “consummate cold war intellectual . . . a master polymath” (2002, pp. 454–
455). Trained as a political scientist specializing on bureaucracy, Simon was fasci-
nated by mathematical formalization. (His mentor at the University of Chicago was
the economist and mathematician Henry Schulz.) Later on, while on the faculty at the
University of Illinois, Simon found himself (at Cooper’s instigation) working at the
Cowles Commission for Economic Research, which “started [him] on a second
education in economics” (Simon 1991). The same Cowles connections led Simon
to forge contacts at the RAND Corporation and particularly one of its subsidiaries, the
Systems Research Laboratory, where he worked on computer simulations and com-
pleted the first artificial intelligence program. Indeed, according to Mirowski, it was
this context—much more than his behaviorist influences—that shaped Simon’s
distinctive conception of administrative behavior, which later earned him the Nobel
Prize in economics.
Bach, Cooper, and Simon were institutional and social mavericks of sorts.
All three had a connection to the University of Chicago, yet none was a typical
representative of what would later be called the “Chicago view”—the staunch
preference for the free enterprise system. Indeed Simon, like many Cowles
affiliates, was originally somewhat of a leftist (though resolutely anti-
communist), and Reder writes of G. L. Bach that he “would not be thought
of as [an example] of the Chicago genre” (1982, p. 6). Although they were all
firmly committed to the application of mathematical and statistical methods to
decision-making, their attachments to economic orthodoxy were weak—indeed
they were mainly involved in applied projects (Bach 1960b). Finally, their
orientation toward business school education and research was competitive
and opportunistic: in Simon’s view, “American business education at that time
[was] a wasteland of vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-
based professionalism” (1991, p. 139). The GSIA was to be the antithesis of all
this and demonstrate the relevance of serious academic research to business
education.18
Truth to tell, the institutional success of the GSIA was a necessary precondi-
tion to the academic legitimation of the founders’ distinctive scientific program.
What was at stake in the GSIA experiment was nothing less than the redefinition
of the dominant form of intellectual capital in the field of business education,
which would soon imply the replacement of institutionalists and business practi-
tioners by true scientists. This transition, in turn, was enabled first by the
mobilization of technical capabilities and the rhetoric of science and, second,
by the enrollment of powerful institutions into the school’s project, namely
philanthropic foundations.
18 There was particular hostility toward Harvard Business School and the academic disciplines. Harvard,
the GSIA faculty felt, impressed through expensive neo-Georgian architecture and elegant faculty offices,
not intellectual rigor (Leavitt 1996, p. 290). The need to differentiate the GSIA from Harvard even
manifested itself in the design of the school's physical building, where a culture of austerity dictated that
there not even be an elevator, although the institution was on sound financial footing. The GSIA faculty
saw this as a badge of true seriousness.
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In describing the qualifications for his school’s faculty, Bach stated: “[W]e wanted a
block of faculty members to provide the disciplinary foundations for the applied fields to
business. For this group, we preferred people from the disciplines (economics, political
science, the behavioral sciences, operations research) and the quantitative methods
(mathematics, computers, statistics, accounting).”19 The GSIA also sought to recruit
different students than did the more traditional business schools. Advanced training in
quantitative analysis and a background in engineeringwere pre-requisites for admission—
in sharp contrast with Harvard Business School, where most of the MBA students had a
liberal arts background. The GSIA master’s degree curriculum was built around four
pillars: (1) organizational behavior; (2) economic analysis; (3) quantitative management
science; and (4) business and society. Bach claimed legitimacy for economics in the
curriculum by stating: “It is essential for the businessman, as citizen and as civic leader, to
understand the broad mechanism of the economic system in which his firm operates and
to be able to think intelligently and independently in arriving at positions on major public
policy issues. Second, economics can provide some tools, but only a modest part of the
necessary tools, for making managerial decisions about the conduct of the firm’” (Bach et
al. 1956, p. 563).
In many ways, the GSIA organized itself as an anti-Harvard–contrary to the logic
of organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), which suggests that
new organizations tend to mimic the most successful player in their field, but
consistent with the more agonistic notion that dominated (or new) players in a field
may engage, instead, in a “subversion strategy” in an effort to transform the rules of
the game to their own benefit (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1975; Emirbayer and Johnson
(2008, p. 11); Fligstein 2002; Fligstein and McAdam 2011). The institution’s leaders
not only challenged dominant strategies in the field, but they did so fiercely, some-
times harboring the self-righteousness of the underdog: “GSIA was hemmed in by
mostly self-enacted enemies: Harvard and those other big, dumb old business-
oriented business schools on one side and the nose-in-the-air traditional university
disciplines on the other. Initially, both Harvard and the disciplines brushed us off, an
upstart fly buzzing about in the Pittsburgh smog. Who had ever heard of Carnegie
Tech? For our part, we rose to the challenge. We were proud, certain that we were the
best and brightest. Our exhilaration and self-confidence were, as always, widely
interpreted as insolent arrogance” (Leavitt 1996, p. 290). Bach and his colleagues
indeed knew that their experiment would ruffle feathers in the business school world.
While their school had been able to attract “human capital” and “financial capital,” it
lacked broader social recognition. Older, larger, and well established institutions still
dominated American business education, and GSIA administrators were well aware
that their school’s success depended on their ability to influence the outside world’s
perception of what was happening within its walls. How they managed to do so, as
we describe below, largely hinged on the providential backing of the richest and
newest foundation in the world. It is, ultimately, the support of the Ford foundation
that propelled the recently established and relatively small institution into the inner
circle of American business schools, thus legitimating its pedagogical and research
models and, correlatively, the disciplinary authority of its faculty.
19 Quoted at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/history/timeline/faculty_bach.html, accessed June 6, 2006.
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New corporations, new politics, new knowledge
Before analyzing the process by which the Ford Foundation became involved in
supporting the new approach to business education promoted by the GSIA, we need
to discuss the broader historical context in which this particular move occurred. Two
points require special consideration here, one economic—the emergence of the large
conglomerate (or firms operating in multiple industries) as the dominant economic
institution—and the other political—the anti-communist obsession of the McCarthy
era. Let us turn first to the economic transformation represented by the rise of the
conglomerate.
By the end of World War II, the multidivisional, diversified conglomerate was well
on its way to replacing the large, horizontally and vertically integrated corporations of
the earlier twentieth century as the dominant organizational form in the American
industrial landscape. The change this represented can be seen in the fact that, prior to
the war, more than 85 % of all Fortune 500 companies operated in a single 2-digit SIC
(Standard Industrial Classification) code, whereas, by 1960, more than half of all
Fortune 500 firms operated in multiple industries (Nohria 2002). Instead of trying to
increase market share through efficient work organization and price leadership, the
many firms that followed the new model sought to ensure their survival by growing
sales and spreading risk across industries and product lines (Fligstein 1990). In this
changed environment, the management of supply chains and the forecasting of
demand thus replaced labor productivity and labor process efficiency as the core
problems faced by corporate decision-makers.
The management of the war effort had posed similar problems. Military and state
demands during the conflict had enabled experimentation with resource-allocation
techniques and the development of statistical methods to foster a massive increase in
production. The war was a formative period for a number of economists and
operations researchers, many of whom ended up at RAND (a think tank connected
to the Department of Defense) as soon as the conflict was over, or in more traditional
academic bases but with their work sponsored by military agencies. This was the case
at the GSIA, where the U.S. Air Force Project SCOOP (Scientific Computation of
Optimum Programs) established a research center devoted to the development of
mathematical models for addressing various industrial problems. It was under the
center’s auspices, for instance, that GSIA economists Charles Holt, Franco
Modigliani, John Muth, and Herbert Simon worked on linear decision rules to plan
production, workforce, and inventory in industrial settings. Originally developed at
the Springdale, Pennsylvania plant of the Pittsburgh Glass Corporation, their ap-
proach was later implemented more broadly and the methods they developed are still
widely used in business forecasting. The same is true of the work of Abraham
Charnes (from mathematics) and William Cooper on the planning and control of
industrial operations. As Cooper later recalled: “I became the recipient of numerous
inquiries as well as visits by personnel from industrial firms eager to learn more about
these new methods. […These academic papers] started a trend in the development of
new methods for managing refineries (and other oil company activities) which
continues to this day” (Cooper 2002, p. 36). Finally, complementing their intellectual
work with institutional activities, Cooper, Simon, and Charnes all became actively
involved in the founding of management science organizations.
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Others followed a different path and moved directly into the corporate world.
Perhaps most emblematic was the trajectory of Robert McNamara, who had been
hired from his teaching post at Harvard Business School to join an operating group in
the Army Air Forces to plan for the wartime production of airplanes. Using the
earliest computers being developed in government laboratories, McNamara relied on
life expectancies of air crews, the application of stochastic simulation, queuing
theory, and other new statistical techniques to formulate acceptable kill ratios and
plan bombing and airplane production runs. After the war, he brought his scientific
language and planning, organization, and management control techniques to the Ford
Motor Company, as one of a small number of “Whiz Kids” hired to turn the
corporation around.
The GSIA experiment was thus not at all an aberration—in fact it was part and
parcel of a broader transformation of conceptions of control in corporations and
government that had been ushered in by the move to a militarized economy and by
the Celler-Kefauver act of 1950 (Fligstein 1990). In this new understanding, manag-
ers were increasingly described as “systems designers,” “information processors,”
and “programmers” involved in regulating the interfaces between the organization
and its competitive and regulatory environment and bringing rational analysis to bear
on a firm’s problems, whatever they might be—a far cry from the focus on problems
of labor control that had dominated the preoccupations of managers and scholars
alike during the 1920s. A 1952 Business Week article describing the new managerial
technologies proclaimed: “The day of the truly professional general management man
isn’t here yet, but it is not far away. That man will be trained for management in
general, rather than in any one phase of business. He’ll learn his technique in school,
rather than on the job.”20 Armed with these new tools, proponents suggested,
managers could work in an organization without knowing the details of its operations
because what mattered was the structure and process of management decision-
making.
Besides the advances in analytical techniques that came out of the war effort and
the rise of new types of business organizations to the management of which these
techniques seemed particularly well-suited, the other reason why the reform of
management seemed urgently needed in the 1950s was political. Since the 1930s,
at least, there had been a strong sentiment among some government and business
elites that capitalism had failed to deliver on its promises, with dramatic consequen-
ces for the world. In the context of the Cold War, this belief was recast in a more
explicitly political form, as economics and business were enlisted to help suppress the
growing influence of communist ideas. This, in the eyes of promoters, implied
efforts to ensure the competent management not only of the macro-economy—as
the creation of economic advice organizations and think tanks during the 1940s
attests— but also of corporations themselves. In a 1948 speech to business execu-
tives, Harvard Business School dean Donald K. David (soon to become chairman of
the Ford Foundation), described effective managers as essential to capitalism’s
victory in the contest with communism: “We face a long continuing struggle
throughout the world for men’s minds and indeed for men’s souls…. In this conflict
of systems, the best way to preserve our system is to make it work. To me the
20 “Can You Teach Management?” Business Week, April 19, 1952, p. 126.
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brightest ray of hope in these troubled times is my firm belief that the business men
can and will measure up to the task.”21 During the McCarthy era, political attacks on
philanthropies for their alleged anti-American biases (which culminated in the 1952–
53 congressional hearings into the foundations’ activities) only made these political
motivations more salient. The Ford and Carnegie foundations, in particular, clearly
understood that fighting the spread of radical ideas and working toward improving
the performance of US corporations would help restore their legitimacy in the eyes of
skeptics.22
The Ford Foundation and the reform of business education: the GSIA as model
In this complicated landscape, the GSIA seemed to offer promise. James Howell, an
economist and coauthor of the 1959 Ford Foundation report on business education,
later revealed that as early as 1954, only one year into Ford’s initial foray into
business school programs, the GSIA was immediately recognized as “the advanced
projects laboratory, the research and development group that [Ford] had to find or
create; fortunately, it already existed” (Howell 1987, p. 9). Perhaps the convergence
was natural according to the Bourdieuian principle that those who occupy similar
positions in distinct (but linked) social spaces tend to form alliances: in other words
there was, in Pierre Bourdieu’s (e.g., 1993) terms, a “homology” between the GSIA’s
unconventional strategy (and newcomer position) in the field of business education,
and Ford’s unconventional support of GSIA in the field of philanthropic foundations
(and its newcomer position, too). In both cases, the strategy helped each institution
distinguish itself from its main competitors: from Harvard and Wharton on the one
hand; and from established heavyweights like the Carnegie and Rockefeller founda-
tions on the other. Finally, personal connections were essential in bringing the GSIA
to the attention of Ford. The school’s dean, Lee Bach, was a protégé of Chicago
professor Theodore Schultz, who had the ear of Ford Foundation officials (Van
Overtveldt 2007). More importantly, perhaps, was the close collaborative relation-
ship, which developed among Lee Bach, Herbert Simon, and Ford Foundation vice
president Thomas Carroll. Simon closely assisted the Ford Foundation in the devel-
opment of its core programs in the behavioral sciences throughout the 1950s, which
sought to bridge the divide with economics and helped craft the distinctively inter-
disciplinary approach promoted by Ford. As for Bach, who was a member of the Ford
Foundation’s external advisory committee, he was recruited by Carroll to work
closely with him on a strategy to achieve reforms in business education.
The strategy Carroll and Bach evolved was relatively straightforward: pour ex-
traordinary amounts of resources into “good or promising schools of business (five
21 Donald K. David, “Business Leadership and the War of Ideas.” Paper presented at the Magazine Forum,
April 27, 1948. In a 1947 article, The New York Times applauded Harvard Business School’s brief pamphlet
Education for Business Responsibility as an intellectual turning point for developing a free-market retort to
those academics calling for greater governmental involvement in the economy. (Russell Porter, “Stress
Social Responsibility as Factor in American Life,” New York Times, September 7, 1947, p. F1.)
22 See Lagemann 1987. Amadae (2003, p. 38) dates the sharp shift to the right of the Ford foundation
policies and intellectual agenda from the replacement of Paul Hoffman by H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., as
president of the Ford Foundation in 1953. Under the latter’s leadership, the Ford foundation decisively
reoriented its activities toward national security and the arguably rather anti-democratic vision of a society
managed by experts. Also see Tadajewski (2009).
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were to be chosen) which would then be the instruments of change for the rest of the
field.” Given the amount of money involved, it was felt that institutions would
quickly fall in line with Ford’s recommendations.23
In an important symbolic message about the future trajectory of business school
research, Harvard Business School did not receive the first large grant issued by the
Ford Foundation.24 Instead, that honor went to Carnegie’s GSIA—a school that had
been in operation for barely 5 years but whose character expressed, according to the
foundation, the ideal-type of the “new” business administration: the training of
doctoral students in the application of the behavioral sciences and mathematics to
problems of administration (Carroll 1959, p. 156). As the dispositional logic of
habitus (Bourdieu 1992) would predict, Ford officials—most of whom were academ-
ics, especially economists—were thus contributing to enhance the world they came
from by positively sanctioning the scientific, research-oriented (as opposed to prac-
tical and vocational) orientation of the GSIA.
Bach and Simon also collaborated closely with the Ford and Carnegie foundations
in the development of two widely published surveys about the state of business
education in the United States. These reports aimed to do for business education what
the Flexner report had done for medical education in 1910. Based on an extensive
survey of business curricula, students, faculty, and research, the two reports presented
the GSIA’s model of management education as the template for other business
schools. MBA courses were to be taught by discipline-trained scholars steeped in
the latest quantitative methods. Business school faculty should be drawn mostly from
academic disciplines such as economics, engineering, mathematics, sociology, psy-
chology, and statistics. Business schools were to restructure their own doctoral
programs by grounding students in the basic social science disciplines and direct
their research more toward developing fundamental theory than advancing or
23 According to an internal review (Wheeler 1965) the Ford Foundation spent about $19 million altogether
on the business school program, or about $138 million in 2011 dollars. Only five schools (Harvard, GSIA,
Stanford, Chicago, Columbia) received major grants, totaling about $15 million. To put these numbers in
perspective, Carnegie’s GSIA was founded with a $6 million grant in 1949: the Ford grant essentially
doubled the amount available for funding the school. Again, to highlight the significance of these amounts,
Harvard Business School’s main fund from alumni donations had totaled $2.5 million from 1908 to 1959.
24 The idea that Harvard would not be part of the Ford Foundation program would have threatened the
legitimacy of all of Ford’s reform efforts. Though Ford ended up supporting HBS more heavily than any
other school, our evidence suggests that foundation officials remained much more hands-off in their dealing
with the institution, using the connection essentially as a way to legitimate their involvement in business
education and treading carefully around the tight personal connections between HBS and the board of the
Ford Foundation. As one member of the foundation’s program on business education described the
situation: “[T]hat first year and a half or so was a continuing sort of running skirmish between Don
[Donald David, Harvard Business School former dean who went on to become executive chair of the Ford
Foundation] and the Program where Don was pushing the Program—where in effect, I think it’s fair to say
that Don was saying: “Look we can easily make a deal here. Just deal us in and I’m your friend. If you deal
us out, I’m going to oppose you at every turn.”” (FFA, Oral History Project, Berelson 1972) As a result,
Ford support for Harvard Business School was directed largely toward increasing the school’s endowment
and diffusing its case study method, whereas everywhere else the foundation was much more actively
pushing schools to embrace a social science model. HBS was thereby essentially able to maintain its
clinical focus and mute any attempt to change its program, while other schools rapidly moved toward
professionalization along scientific-academic lines.
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analyzing existing managerial practice. Finally, research was to be organized around
interdisciplinary teams rather than individuals (Crowther-Heyck 2006a, b).
A 1965 examination of the impact of the 1959 Ford Foundation’s Gordon-Howell
report on business education noted several changes that signaled the foundation’s
success in building more research-oriented business faculties (Wheeler 1965). First,
business schools significantly increased the number of faculty with doctoral degrees,
and many moved toward adopting academic hiring and promotion processes similar to
those found in disciplinary departments. Between 1954 and 1964, for instance, the
proportion of fulltime faculty with doctoral degrees at the 25 largest business schools
rose from about 69 % to 83 %. As a result, the percentage of the largest 25 schools that
met AACSB accreditation standards25 jumped from about 50 % in 1954 to 100 % by
1965 (Wheeler 1965). Second, the next generation of business school professors was
now being educated in doctoral programs that emphasized disciplinary foundations and
quantitative methods. Business schools began not only to hire faculty members from
other business schools but also to actively recruit research-oriented, discipline-trained
faculty from mathematics, economics, and statistics. Third, the greater emphasis on
published research led to the flourishing of new academic outlets in business-related
fields, which in turn helped promote research activity. For example, Stanford’s Graduate
School of Business in the early 1950s was a place, according to one observer, where “the
amount of time devoted to research was left entirely to individual proclivities” while
“[m]ost faculty members devoted their surplus time to consulting” (Wheeler 1965). Nor
did the school consider an individual’s research output in decisions about promotion and
tenure. Between 1959 and 1969, however, Stanford began to implement the Ford
Foundation reforms aggressively by recruiting faculty, not only from GSIA, but from
the nation’s top economics and psychology departments. By 1969, Stanford’s business
school enjoyed an academic reputation as one of the premier business school research
institutions. Even the so-called “trickle-down” schools, such as Northwestern, Wharton,
and MIT deliberately avoided hiring their own doctoral students for faculty positions:
“[T]he filling of any new post is now viewed as a sacred opportunity and approached
with the greatest of care,”wrote JosephWillits aboutWharton’s post-1959 reforms (Sass
1982, p. 259).
Rationality: economics vs. the behavioral sciences
It is in this context that the GSIA “became an economics nova,” as James March later
put it26. No less than seven individuals who taught at the GSIA from the mid-1950s to
the mid-1970s (Herbert Simon, Franco Modigliani, Merton Miller, Robert Lucas, and
Edward Prescott) and two GSIA PhDs (Finn Kydland and Oliver Williamson) have
since been awarded the Nobel prize in economics—an unusual feat for a small, young
institution, and a business school to boot. Even more significant, perhaps, is the
25 The AACSB was originally set up in 1917 by the founding deans of the leading business schools to help
spearhead the professionalization of business education and management as a profession. In the 1950s, the
organization shifted its focus to serve as an accrediting institution for business education. Still, it was
relatively weak and increasingly perceived as irrelevant by the better business schools.
26 See http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/about-tepper/history/the-b-school-change-agents/carnegie-connections/
index.aspx.
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distinctive style of research that took root at the GSIA. Aside from the original
behaviorist group around Simon, much of the faculty roster from the 1950s through
the 1970s reads like a Who’s Who of free-market economics and, in particular,
announces the monetarist and microeconomic foundations revolutions to come in
macroeconomics: in this vein, let us just mention monetarist Allan Meltzer; John
Muth, who—in a near complete reversal of Simon’s bounded rationality conceptual-
ization—originated the rational expectations hypothesis (Sent 2002); and Thomas
Sargent, Robert Lucas, and Leonard Rapping, who developed the rational expect-
ations hypothesis in the context of a critique of macroeconomics. Edward Prescott,
who is also important in this line of analysis (his work uses the rational expectations
hypothesis to make sense of the business cycle), was a student of Lucas at the GSIA,
and Finn Kydland, a student of Prescott.27
It is not surprising that these orientations would develop at the GSIA rather than
elsewhere. In the first place, the GSIA economics faculty was low on symbolic and
social capital due to the school’s peripheral location (both geographic and institu-
tional). Consequently, faculty members sought to boost their academic status by
ruthlessly proclaiming their scientific purity; as Augier and Prietula wrote: “It was
a business school, but they also thought of themselves as reforming economics”
(2007, p.509). Moreover, Herbert Simon’s attempts to “preach the heresies of
bounded rationality” to the economists may have been instrumental in pushing some
of them to articulate more explicitly their (contrary) views—the idea, known as the
rational expectations hypothesis, that people are in fact so rational that their expect-
ations about future states of the economy are correct on average.28 As Simon
described it retrospectively, “I heckled the GSIA economists about their ridiculous
assumptions about human omniscience, and they increasingly viewed me as the main
obstacle to building ‘real’ economics in the school” (1991, p. 144).29 By 1965 the
school’s economists were united enough in their views to cause Simon to quit in
disgust and find refuge in the psychology department.
Also instrumental in developing intellectual character of GSIA was the fact that a
large proportion of GSIA recruits in economics came either from the center of free-
market economics—the University of Chicago—or from close affiliates. (Allan
Meltzer, for instance, who was a pillar of the GSIA from 1957 onwards, is a “second
generation” Chicagoan—his mentor at UCLA and longtime collaborator, Karl
Brunner, was a disciple of Milton Friedman; all three, in turn, are key figures of
academic monetarism.) There were not very many top departments hiring Chicago
graduates during the heyday of Keynesian economics: hence their relegation to a
business school, however important in retrospect. As we describe in the next section,
the hinged ecology of business schools became, over time and through the massive
27 Kydland was Prescott’s student in the early 1970s, and also earned the Nobel Prize in economics with his
mentor in 2004.
28 Robert Lucas, for instance, said that “one can see the extent to which Muth was influenced by and
reacting to Herbert Simon’s work on behavioral economics, and how this led him to such a radically non-
behavioral hypothesis as rational expectations. (I once tried to discuss this with Herb, thinking of it as an
instance of the enormous, productive influence he had on all of us, but he took offense at the suggestion)”
(McCallum 1999).
29 A similar story would play out later at the Chicago GSB, where behaviorism faced the strong opposition
of economists (Van Overtveldt 2007).
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expansion of business education in the following decades, an important vehicle for
the broader diffusion of Chicago approaches.
Markets triumphant
While University of Chicago-trained faculty had shaped the disciplinary trajectory of
Carnegie’s GSIA, it was not until the late 1950s that Chicago’s own business school
took a disciplinary turn. Allen Wallis, the dean of the University of Chicago’s
Graduate School of Business (GSB) from 1956 to 1962,30 noted that an earlier
attempt to realize this goal had been thwarted by the institution’s chancellor, Robert
Maynard Hutchins, who questioned the place of business education at the university
and consequently starved the school for resources. Under the new chancellor,
Lawrence Klimpton, the effort to restore business school education and research on
sounder academic footing was now a priority, Wallis asserted in Chicago’s grant
application to the Ford Foundation in 1957 (Wallis 1957)
W. Allen Wallis was a Columbia-trained statistician but had spent time in the
Chicago economics department during the 1930s. It is there that he forged a life-long
friendship with two fellow students, Milton Friedman and George Stigler; the three
men were reunited again during the war when they worked at the U.S. Navy-
sponsored Statistical Research Group at Columbia University. Partly thanks to
Friedman’s influence, the University of Chicago recruited Wallis shortly after the
war to found what became the Department of Statistics, which soon successfully
enlisted the support of the Rockefeller Foundation to serve as an engine for the
dissemination of statistical methods to other fields (Olkin 1991).
Together with associate dean James Lorie (another Chicago-trained economist and
free market enthusiast), Wallis defended the idea that a business school should not be
very different from the rest of the university: it should be oriented toward further
learning, as opposed to vocational training, and should do first-rate research. The
reformed GSB would draw upon disciplinary faculty who were working in areas most
closely related to business—statistics, accounting, law, and, especially, economics—a
far cry from the liberal arts foundation that Leon Marshall, the school’s first dean, had
called for in the early years of the school. Wallis had extensive control over hiring and
leveraged his own academic reputation to recruit like-minded economists and statis-
ticians. He was described as “shrewd and indeed almost ruthless in carrying out his
program” (Gordon 1957).
An important “coup” that would turn out to be very consequential for the business
school was the hiring, in 1958, of Wallis’ friend George Stigler –partly against Ford
Foundation wishes. Following the GSIA experience, Ford had earmarked its business
school grants for the development of “behavioral science,” and at least one founda-
tion staff member saw early on that interdisciplinarity was not a route that Chicago
was likely to take: “Emphasis on the economic ingredient of the curriculum (and
probably of a traditional Chicago mold particularly if George Stigler accepts the
Walgreen professorship) might override the other social science elements” (Gordon
30 The Chicago GSB was renamed the Booth School of Business in 2008. However to avoid anachronism,
we use its old name throughout this article.
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1957, p.43). Only a decade later, two other Ford Foundation officials noted with some
disappointment that this prediction about the dominance of economics at the GSB had
been realized and reaffirmed their position that “business is too important an institu-
tion to be studied by only the economists” (Carroll 1958 p.45; Howell 1966). In the
meantime, though, the uniting of Friedman (who had been teaching at Chicago since
1946), Stigler, and Wallis in a major academic institution had begun to transform
American economics; indeed it was to become “the key to the development and
eventual dominance of the Chicago view” (Reder 1982, p. 10), which articulates the
need to limit government economic power. To this trio we might add Aaron Director,
Friedman’s brother in law, who, with support from other conservative foundations
(the Volker Fund, the Olin Foundation) helped transform the University of Chicago
Law School into an economists’ powerhouse (Coase 1993; Peck 2008; Van Horn
2009). Importantly, all four—and many others in the economics department and the
GSB—shared a firm belief in the power of free markets and a strong distaste for
government action. All were early members of the Mont Pèlerin Society, a select club
set up by, among others, their Chicago colleague Friedrich von Hayek31 in the 1940s
that many regard as the original vehicle for the elaboration and diffusion of neo-
liberal thought (see, for example, Cockett 1994; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009).32
The embedding of economics at the Chicago GSB: the role of philanthropies
Although they drew upon the same rhetoric of scientific rigor as Carnegie, the leaders
of the Chicago GSB to some extent regarded their institution as an anti-GSIA,
rejecting the behavioral sciences model in favor of economics, eschewing the con-
nection with engineering, and promoting an explicitly pro-market view. Unlike the
GSIA, however, they were embedded in one of America’s best universities, which
gave them considerably more authority. This rationale (as well as Wallis’ connections
to the foundation world) ultimately convinced Ford that the GSB would offer a solid
base for business education: the school soon received the second (after GSIA) largest
grant as one of Ford’s centers of excellence, a great advantage in its dealing with the
university administration. As one foundation official wrote, the GSB now “offers a
program in business education that is more nearly professional than is characteristic
of much business education in that it offers a training which cannot readily be
acquired simply by doing and which might genuinely distinguish the business school
educated businessman from those who have not had the advantage of such training”
(1958, Ford Foundation Archives, Box 410, “The Files”).
The transformation was swift. Between 1957 and 1963, the number of PhD
candidates in the school’s doctoral programs increased from 18 to 70. Faculty ranks
swelled to 70 members, with only 11 holdovers from when Wallis became dean. Of
the new faculty, “about 20 % came from faculties of other schools of business, about
40 % from faculties of other departments (principally economics), about 25 % from
31 Hayek, however, taught in the Committee on Social Thought, having failed to secure an appointment in
the economics department.
32 Over the years, the Chicago economics “nebulae” would end up providing a host of Mont Pèlerin
recruits, such as Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Harold Demsetz, Armen
Alchian, and Richard Posner, to cite only some of the most well-known. The first three of these men also
won the Nobel Prize in economics.
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business and government, and about 15 % came to the School directly from their
completion of graduate work.” Of the 51 faculty in 1959, 22 had a PhD in economics
(Whitley 1986, p. 162). The trend continued into the 1960s with the next dean, MIT-
trained industrial economist George Schultz. Pursuing Wallis’s institutional work,
Schultz launched a three-year study of the impact of economic conditions and
technological change on labor relations and used the program to create within the
business school an economics department that rivaled the top arts and sciences-based
economics departments in the United States.
Important interests in the business community also supported this organizational
revamping. The school created an Associates Program, which enlisted the financial
commitment of 100 corporations to support the new strategy. Additional backing
came from private, often conservative foundations, which George Stigler, in partic-
ular, pursued assiduously. One such foundation was the Walgreen Fund, whose
history has been recently revealed by Edward Nik-Khah (2011). The story begins
in 1937, when Charles Walgreen, founder of the American chain of drugstores, made
a gift of $550,000 to the University of Chicago to establish a new academic
foundation. Earlier Walgreen had removed his niece from the university on the
grounds that she was being taught communistic theories; the Walgreen Fund was
meant to counterbalance these views by fostering “greater appreciation of American
life and values among University of Chicago students.” It originally served to sponsor
public lectures series by high-profile political theorists—it was under its auspices, for
instance, that political philosopher Leo Strauss gave his famous lectures on “Natural
Right and History” in the 1940s or that Hannah Arendt first presented (in 1958) what
was to become The Human Condition.
According to Nik-Khah, it was Wallis who persuaded [University of Chicago]
President Kimpton to remove the Walgreen Fund from political science and place it
under the care of the GSB (2011, n. 21, p. 128). Once at the GSB, the Walgreen Fund
came under the control of George Stigler, who used it to support his own as well as
other economists’ research, sponsor his famous industrial economics workshop, and
generally build up an economics team to his liking by luring faculty away from other
universities—toward both the business school and the economics department. (Gary
Becker and Robert Lucas, for instance, came back to Chicago under very favorable
conditions.) Personally distrustful of large, established foundations and even more of
public money, Stigler later on succeeded in securing further support from a host of
smaller private donors for a Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, which
lives on today as the Stigler center.
These institutional resources helped Stigler, together with Milton Friedman (in the
economics department) and Aaron Director (at the law school, also a recipient of Ford
Foundation largesse) to advance an intellectual program that sought to transform
prevailing views about government, markets, and corporations. With ferocious verve,
Stigler’s writings attacked any analysis of the American economy or American
corporations that strayed away from the competitive model, whether it came from
institutionalism (Berle and Means, Galbraith) or neoclassicism (Chamberlin). His
empirical studies, many of which were produced under contract, showed the disutility
of government regulation33 and the efficient character of private monopolies; they did
33 On this topic, also see the work of Stigler’s colleagues at the GSB, Sam Peltzman, and Merton Miller.
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much, indeed, to provide a rationale for the movement of deregulation that took place
in the 1980s and to support the benign view of antitrust defended by much of the
Chicago-originated law and economics scholarship.34
The merging of finance with economics
Perhaps the most direct consequence of the institutionalization of a powerful core of
neoclassical economists within American business schools, and at the Chicago GSB in
particular, however, was the transformation of finance into “financial economics”—a
shift that, as MacKenzie (2006) has suggested, had considerable consequences for the
development of financial practices themselves. Finance was an old topic in American
business schools, but up until the mid-1960s the subject’s orientation was mainly
descriptive and institutional. Financial knowledge was deemed relevant primarily to
managers within corporations; consequently, practitioners played an important role in
the teaching of financial subjects. AsWhitley (1986) and Jovanovic (2008) have shown,
however, this was no longer true by the 1980s. The American Finance Association had
become dominated by academics; financial research was based on high-level mathe-
matics and statistics and set in a neoclassical microeconomics framework. The central
questions in the discipline now had to do with financial markets—not with firms.
Importantly, the GSIA had been an important locus for this transformation—it is
there that Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller produced the theorem about capital
market structure that earned them the economics Nobel Prize. But Modigliani
promptly went on to MIT, while Miller moved to the Chicago GSB, which arguably
became from then on the main intellectual center for the development of financial
economics. The key asset that spurred Chicago’s ascendancy in the field, however,
was not its scholars but the existence of a unique financial database housed—thanks
to a gift from Merrill Lynch—on the university premises.35 As MacKenzie points out,
the “CRSP’s [Center for Research in Security Prices] tapes gave U.S. finance
academics from the mid-1960s an advantage over their predecessors: easy access to
massive volumes of data in a format that facilitated analysis. Even at the start of the
1960s, researchers such as the Chicago PhD student Arnold B. Moore were still
having to construct stock-price series by hand from runs of the Wall Street Journal.”
(2006, p. 69)
The approach to finance developed at the GSB was quintessential Chicago eco-
nomics: free-market-oriented and interested only in the predictive power of theory,
irrespective of the realism of assumptions (MacKenzie 2006, pp. 55, 71). Since the
technical abilities involved were not trivial, however, “these databases and their
associated skills enabled the leaders of MFT [Modern Finance Theory] to claim
‘positive’ scientific status for their program and to control the production of a massive
amount of research (…) regardless of the difficulties involved in relating economic
34 See, for example, Nelson (1987), Noll (1985) on the deregulation movement, and Mercuro and Medema
(1997) on law and economics in the United States.
35 Starting in 1959, the investment bank Merrill Lynch, whose officials had developed an interest in modern
financial theory, supplied the GSB with a series of grants to set up the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). Over a period of 22 years, the center would receive a total of $1 million. The CRSP was
devoted mainly to gathering the prices, dividends, and rates of return of all stocks listed and trading on the
New York Stock Exchange since 1926.
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models of perfect markets in equilibrium to stock market price changes and similar
phenomena” (Whitley 1986, p. 173). Thus Chicago finance’s perhaps best known
product, the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970), asserted in its strong form that
the prices of securities always perfectly reflect all known information. Consequently,
it is impossible to game the market and predict what the future value of a stock may
be—rather, the movement of stock prices is a “random walk” (Fama 1965). Hence a
firm’s stock price is the best reflector of that firm’s fundamental economic value.
This view did not sit very well, at least initially, with practitioners and old finance
types, who were used to thinking of themselves as clever analysts with a lot of
intuition.36 But these were not the primary audiences the new financial economists
sought to appeal to. They cared first about establishing themselves in mainstream
economic journals and conferences, which they did with remarkable swiftness–due,
in part, to impressive displays of probabilistic and mathematical skill (Jovanovic
2008). Yet because the business school was in the process of being reorganized as a
thoroughly scientific institution, and because the efficient markets model performed
increasingly well in empirical tests (thanks, possibly, to what MacKenzie (2006),
following Callon (1998), calls their “performativity” in shaping how market actors
priced assets), the mastery of the language and techniques of financial economics
soon became an indispensable credentialing device not only for finance professors
but also for practitioners in the financial markets. This evolution also led many
business schools to move beyond training general managers to training professional
investors, especially in the areas of private equity, leveraged buy-out firms, and hedge
funds.
More importantly, perhaps, efficient markets theory had important consequences
for the way corporations were viewed and run. At bottom, the theory was rooted in
Milton Friedman’s belief that the purpose of the corporation was to maximize
financial value (“Business,” Friedman (1970) famously said, has “no other social
responsibility than to increase profits”). Financial economists saw the large diversi-
fied conglomerates that dominated the American economic landscape as examples of
managerial behavior that decreased the market value of firms and were therefore
harmful to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and Ruback 1983). They
took from efficient markets theory the notion that the total market value of a firm’s
shares accurately predicts the firm’s future expected cash flows. The theory thus
provided a rationale for subjecting corporate strategy and managerial action to the
discipline of shareholders, which led its proponents to endorse the vast expansion in
the market for corporate control that took place in the 1980s (Dobbin and Zorn 2005).
Second, the theory also offered an argument for compensating managers on the basis
of stock performance in the form of stock options—a quite revolutionary idea at the
time. Finally, since a basic assumption was that stock price reflects the fundamental
value of the firm, then raising stock price should be the exclusive focus of managers’
actions. Together, these propositions came to be known as “agency theory.”
36 See MacKenzie 2006; Whitley 1986. Other achievements of financial economics—all based on the view
of efficient financial markets—did not fare much better: the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe 1964), for
instance, held that the only optimal portfolio was the entire market—which analysts found unhelpful at first.
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Agency theory and the managerial revolution in reverse
Agency theory was the brainchild of two University of Chicago graduates, William
Meckling and Michael Jensen. The strength of the Chicago GSB was (and still is) its
scientific legitimacy, which the school drew from its close connection to the univer-
sity’s economics department (in fact it was not so much a connection as a deep
interpenetration, since a large proportion of the faculty had appointments at both
institutions).37 As a result, Chicago economists’ standard line—that competitive
pressures would keep firms on their feet—made Chicago-originated theories some-
what irrelevant to corporate governance. They were unhelpful both to corporations
looking for practical solutions and to governments interested in developing regulatory
rules.
But agency theory was different. It showed an eagerness to change the world, using
practical prescriptions derived from economic theory. In that sense, its objectives were
well-aligned with the missionary spirit evinced by some Chicago luminaries (Milton
Friedman and Friedrich Hayek most prominently), though its direction—toward corpo-
rate governance—was unusual. To understand how this new orientation came about, we
need to back up a bit and consider the social and academic trajectory of agency theory’s
promoters.
In 1963, shortly after launching the first phase of the curricular reforms at the
Chicago GSB, Allen Wallis assumed the presidency of the University of Rochester—
a job he would hold for 20 years. Once there, he immediately established a business
school and staffed it with graduates from his alma mater and former employer; and
thus Rochester became a sort of eastern outpost of Chicago economics in the process.
Of course, like the Carnegie faculty before them, Rochester’s recruits were acutely
aware of their marginality. They were young and the school was brand new. Many
had gotten their PhDs from the Chicago business school, an oddity at the time. Their
scientific papers were going nowhere—even the Chicago-dominated Journal of
Political Economy would not publish their work, perhaps because of the implicit
challenge they presented to the Chicago dogma that competition solves all economic
problems.
Pierre Bourdieu has suggested that newcomers in a field who are “outside the
beaten tracks cannot “beat the dominant at their own game” unless they make
additional, strictly scientific investments from which they cannot expect high profits,
at least in the short run, since the whole logic of the system is against them” (1975, p.
30). In Carnegie’s case, these investments included drawing in the interests of
foundations, notably but not exclusively the Ford foundation, and developing for-
malized approaches to business problems. Rochester was in a similar structural
position. On the financial front, it did not have the backing of the Ford Foundation
but the University of Rochester “was flush with capital” throughout much of the
1960s and had an endowment behind only Harvard’s and Yale’s, thanks to the support
of local patrons (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita 1999, p. 279). It was also one of the
37 This was an explicit policy (See Emmett 2007). As Wallis said: “If a person wasn’t good enough in his
field to be welcome in the appropriate department, we did not want him either” (Olkin 1991, 136). In 2008,
economics or finance PhDs represented 62 % of the faculty at the Chicago Booth School (the GSB’s new
name). In other top US business schools, these figures hovered around 45 %, with the notable exception of
Harvard (30 %). (authors’ calculations)
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first business schools to establish a lucrative executives’ program (at a time when the
region around Rochester was a flourishing industrial park, dominated by Eastman
Kodak and Xerox).
On the symbolic front, Rochester scholars mobilized scientific institutions and
language in a highly effective manner. They founded new scholarly reviews in
economics, finance, and accounting, whose contributors, they claimed, practiced
“positive science.”38 The Journal of Accounting and Economics, The Journal of
Financial Economics, the Journal of Monetary Economics, and the Carnegie-
Rochester conferences series in public policy (which famously published Robert
Lucas’s critique of econometrics (1976) in its first issue) were all edited there. And
they cultivated the connection with Chicago: this is most evident when we look at the
list of the affiliations of all authors who have published in the Journal of Financial
Economics. Among all the papers published in the journal from 1974 (date of its
founding) to 2004, Chicago authors have published the most papers (123) followed
by the University of Rochester faculty (114) (this together accounts for close to 50 %
of the top 40 publishing authors).
It is in this atmosphere of militant scientism with strong practical claims that
agency theory created a unified approach to organizations that would have repercus-
sions in corporate finance, organizational behavior, accounting, and corporate gov-
ernance. Unlike much of the earlier scholarship in business schools, the core ideas of
agency theory were derived not from inductive observation and practical experience
but, instead, from the theoretical musings of a newly revitalized neoclassical eco-
nomic theory. In the early 1970s, economists thus brought a theoretical, deductive
approach to business school research, the lack of which had concerned academics at
the Ford and Carnegie foundations and haunted business education from the start.
Drawing on the legitimacy of economics, agency theory in the business school had
the authority to redefine managerial action and the nature of the corporation, setting
in motion a “managerial revolution in reverse,” whereby managers were transformed,
both symbolically and materially, into major corporate owners (Hall and Leibman
1998; Bebchuk and Fried 2006).
What gave particular visibility and influence to agency theorists like Jensen and
his colleagues was that—unlike many of their disciplinary brethren—they made
considerable efforts to disseminate their ideas and findings not only through tradi-
tional academic channels, such as journals and professional meetings, but into the
classroom and the wider world of practice. This practical habitus of Michael Jensen,
in particular, was revealed in a rather dramatic fashion when he accepted a position at
Harvard Business School, a relocation that made the achievement of a wider influ-
ence possible (but cut him off from many scientifically “pure” colleagues who saw
the move as a sellout). Through practitioner-oriented publications such as the
Harvard Business Review and regular commentary and editorials in international
newspapers such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, Jensen and
colleagues marshaled their ideas to explain the changing corporate environment and
offer a prescriptive set of approaches to improve corporate profitability. A new
38 The accountants were perhaps the most creative. They borrowed from Friedman’s appeal to Popper in his
“methodology of positive economics,” as well as from their Rochester colleagues’ ventures into “positive
political theory,” to craft a new science they dubbed “positive accounting.”
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generation of consulting firms, some of them originating from within academia,
arrived on the scene that mobilized principal-agent ideas to urge the reform of
executive compensation practices, to encourage shareholder activism, and to promote
new firm performance measures (Kay 1992; Stern et al. 2003). Some academics
served as consultants and expert witnesses, advocating for stock-based compensation
in congressional hearings and defending such plans from shareholder lawsuits. In
some cases they went as far as running as alternate directors on behalf of takeover
firms trying to change the composition of their boards of directors (Jensen himself as
well as Kevin Murphy, a Rochester-trained economist and Jensen co-author, were
both involved in such actions).39
Through these channels, the “liminal space” between economic “science” and
“practice” (Eyal 2002) began to fill up with experts and consultants, and agency
theory’s rhetorical apparatus underpinned the diffusion of a variety of new corporate
strategies. For example, Michael Jensen’s media interventions helped legitimate the
takeover movement, encouraged the proliferation of executive stock options to align
incentives between executives and shareholders, and argued that leveraging corpo-
rations with debt was the best way to discipline supposedly wasteful managers.
Institutional Investor in 1985 remarked on the economic sense-making that Jensen
provided for the hostile takeover movement, writing that Jensen “has come out in
favor of corporate raiders and greenmailers to the point of developing an economic
rationale for takeovers.”40 Jensen argued that the deregulation that enabled hostile
takeovers had resulted in a more efficient market within the US economy for the right
to control corporate assets. He stated that managers, who are unable to keep their
companies efficient, as primarily measured by the firm’s stock price, will suffer the
consequences in the form of a takeover. Jensen framed the market for corporate
control as one in which alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to manage
corporate resources, and he stated that takeover entrepreneurs and imaginative in-
vestment bankers will continue to prosper: he talked about takeover “artists” like T.
Boone Pickens not as financial speculators but as “inventors.”41 Frank Dobbin and
Dirk Zorn have suggested that Jensen’s published articles on the takeover movement
helped legitimize takeover activity by presenting it as a type of societal service, thus
“convinc[ing] the world that what [takeover artists] did for a living, far from
threatening the corporation, was efficient: that it was in the interest of the shareholder
and the broader public interest” (2005, p. 187). It was only later that corporate
39 When an activist investor group or corporate raider seeks to purchase a firm through a hostile takeover
they typically need to remove the old board members in order to vote in favor of the takeover. One often
used tactic is the nomination of an alternate slate of directors who are presented to shareholders. Since most
shareholders are interested in receiving the higher price being offered by the hostile takeover firm,
shareholders will often vote in favor of the new slate of directors. Directors on this new slate are chosen
on being favorable to the takeover event and are usually selected and paid by the hostile takeover firm. See
Baker and Smith 1998.
40 Michael Ver Meulen, “The Iconoclast of M&A,” Institutional Investor, vol. 19, issue 8, August 1985, p.
71. Jensen focuses on three benefits of takeovers, stating that they do not harm shareholders and are an
efficient use of a company’s resources. Golden parachutes, which guarantee multi-million dollar payouts to
CEOs in the event of a takeover, are defensible, in Jensen’s view, since shareholders still benefit when a
firm is taken over.
41 Michael Jensen, “A Helping Hand for Entrenched Managers” Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition).
November 4, 1987, p. 1.
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scandals showed that options, strike prices, and preferred stock could be mere covers
for facilitating fraud (Dobbin and Jung 2010). In the meantime, however, these
devices took on a fetishistic character, making the stock price of a company appear
as an end in itself. Prominent business organizations switched from advocating a
“stakeholder view” in corporate decision-making to embracing the “shareholder”
maximization imperative. In 1990, for instance, the Business Roundtable, a group
of chief executives of the largest US.companies, still emphasized in its mission
statement “the directors’ responsibility to carefully weigh the interests of all stake-
holders as part of their responsibility to the corporation or to the long-term interests of
its shareholders.” By 1997, the same organization argued that in its view, “the
paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s
stockholders; the interests of other stakeholders are relevant as a derivative of the
duty to the stockholders.” (Business Roundtable mission statements)
The linked ecologies of economics and business
Over a century ago, a vanguard of (in many cases) European-educated economists
founded business schools with the aim of promoting a better integration of business
with American society, sometimes pressing for an explicitly reformist social agenda
in the process. From then on, business schools became one of the key organizational
vehicles for the design, transmission, reproduction, and change of conceptions
regarding the place of corporations and their managers in the American cultural
landscape.42 By constructing management as a profession, business schools infused
large organizations and their managers with legitimacy in shaping the new social
order. This professionalization of managerial authority was, in a sense, America’s
cultural revolution: as increasingly large proportions of “managers” went through
business schools over time (Mayo et al. 2007). The skills, outlooks, and habits forged
in the business school environment became ever more closely integrated into corpo-
rate practices and understandings (Davis 2009).
Paradoxically, however, the evolution of American business schools over the long
run also displays a move in the other direction—toward increasingly abstract and
technical knowledge rooted in the social scientific disciplines, most specifically
economics, even financial economics. As we have seen, philanthropic foundations,
whose boards were generally filled with people with strong academic connections,
were instrumental in spearheading this “scientific” transformation, which achieved its
most spectacular results at the GSIA and at the Chicago GSB. The corporate world
was closely involved, too, serving as a financial backer of intellectual enterprises seen
as politically supportive (Stigler’s Walgreen Fund) or materially useful (the Center for
Research on Security Prices at the Chicago GSB, or the Wharton Forecasting Unit).
Consequently, business schools became increasingly intertwined with the long-term
evolution of economic thought and technique over the course of the twentieth
century, as both recipients and agents of scientific and intellectual change. We can
see evidence of this in the growing academic prominence of business school faculty
42 Industrial settings were another place where these ideas evolved (see Shapin 2008).
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within the economics mainstream, in the significant growth of economics PhDs in
business school appointments (particularly striking at the schools we have studied),
and in the sharply asymmetric patterns of citation between the economics and
business literatures (Pieters and Baumgartner 2002; Ferraro et al. 2005). 43
It is useful to remember that things used to be different. First, the postwar
behavioral science model in business schools allowed many business disciplines to
flourish and to assert their autonomy, and encroached on the jurisdiction secured by
economists in the early days of business education. Second, well into the 1970s,
business school appointments were less prestigious than departmental appointments
for economists. Hence the entrenchment of certain fields (finance), and certain
approaches (monetarism, rational expectations, agency theory) in business schools
as opposed to economics departments denoted their (initially) somewhat marginal
status relative to the substantive and ideological mainstream of the discipline. The
GSIA (in the 1950s and 1960s mainly) and the University of Rochester business
school (in the 1970s and 1980s) served as laboratories of sorts for people who, to
some extent, operated on the paradigmatic edges of the economics profession and
sought, consciously or unconsciously, to bridge their distance from the center of the
field by engaging in forms of scientific overcompensation—whether that involved
complex modeling techniques, the link to other behavioral sciences, or institution-
building through scientific journals. The frequent commentaries on the tough seminar
culture at Carnegie and Rochester might serve as an illustration of this particular form
of scientific purity. As one member of the Carnegie GSIA during the late 1950s put it:
“the search for the truth was a core value. The intellectual atmosphere was more than
just lively, open, and confrontational. I had found plenty of all those at Chicago, but
there the debate was carried on in House of Commons style. There the purpose, I
always felt, was more to be clever than to be right. Who had the sharpest wit? The
most biting retort?” (Leavitt 1996, p. 290).
Part of the self-confidence displayed in this quote may be explained, on the one
hand, by the embattled position of these methodological and theoretical approaches in
a generally unfriendly profession and, on the other, by a craving for institutional and
personal status. In a field that rewards scientific prowess above all else, the volunta-
ristic strategy of the GSIA and Rochester upstarts paid off in the end, both intellec-
tually and professionally. The institutional study of labor in industrial settings
practiced at Wharton during the interwar period gave way to more technical
approaches to management based on decision theory and the early use of computers,
for which Herbert Simon was later rewarded by a Nobel prize in economics.
Traditional macroeconomics was demoted because rational expectations theorists
groomed at the GSIA argued that its microeconomic foundations were scientifically
weak; the claim revolutionized the discipline and shaped the practice of economic
science for many decades to come. Traditional finance was overpowered by financial
economics at Chicago and Rochester business schools on the grounds that it was
unscientific and led to inefficient management; as we have suggested, that particular
intellectual shift had a transformative effect well beyond the boundaries of academia.
43 These citations studies show that marketing, management, operations research, and especially account-
ing and finance cite economics heavily, but that the reverse is not true.
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In each period, the knowledge-making practices of American business schools
were especially successful when they were perceived by powerful constituencies (for
instance in the philanthropic world) to address the new “problems” faced by corpo-
rations in a way that appeared not only substantively valuable but also much more
technical and “scientific.” The new theories provided a new language, and new
categories of understanding and action, that came to make sense of and sustain—
until the next series of tools, concepts, and business recipes came along—important
changes in the nature of and “conceptions of control” within American corporations.
Finally, these transformations in the foundations of business knowledge, as well as
the rise in prominence of business schools within universities also had powerful
consequences for the linked discipline of economics, reorienting it away from its
“public purpose” missions (Bernstein 2001) and increasingly toward the needs and
concerns of private firms and markets (Fourcade 2009). This linkage may have been
one of the most important drivers of the so-called neoliberal revolution—and its
continued strength may be one of the reasons why a rollback on that revolution has
not happened yet.
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